Making Secure Systems Easy for the Public to Use

Lorrie Faith Cranor

lorrie.cranor.org @lorrietweet





Security

Human error is the root cause of most data breaches

Financial damage of data leaks must be considered by firms

Markel Direct













The Weakest Link: The Role of Human Error in Cybersecurity



Almost 90% of Cyber **Attacks are Caused by Human Error or Behavior**

By Ross Kelly - March 3, 2017













Few store managers would respond to revelations that a junior assistant had been stealing from the cash register by investing thousands of dollars in new security cameras. It could be far cheaper for them to instill hiring practices that

The human threat

- Malicious humans
- Clueless humans
- Unmotivated humans
- Humans constrained by human limitations



Settings













NEW YORK POST





Twitter's New Privacy Policy

Means You Need to Change Your

By Nancy Messieh / May 23, 2017 / 3 minutes

SOCIAL MEDIA, SECURITY

ENTERPRISE

Google clarifies its location tracking help page for confused users

by Ellen Tannam







Google Maps on mobile device. Image: Piotr




















message:



what should you do about it?



If you haven't logged in to Twitter since the

changes were announced, you'll see this

Twitter recently **introduced** an updated privacy policy announcing changes to how they collect user data and deliver advertising into your timeline. So what does the update mean and





























Facebook to make privacy settings less difficult to use

By Nicolas Vega

March 28, 2018 | 11:16am



Facebook said Wednesday it will finally simplify the notoriously confusing maze of privacy settings on its site.

The embattled social network — which previously sent users to more than a dozen different pages when they wanted to adjust the amount of data they shared, or see what third-party apps had access to their information - announced plans to consolidate those settings onto one central page.

Privacy is complicated





Better together

Examining
security/privacy and
usability together is often
critical for achieving
either

Don't assume you always have to tradeoff security for usability, sometimes you can achieve both!



USENIX Security 1999

Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0

Alma Whitten School of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 alma@cs.cmu.edu

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EECS and SIMS
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720
tygar@cs.berkeley.edu

Abstract

User errors cause or contribute to most computer security failures, yet user interfaces for security still

tand to be alumay confusing or near nearistant Is

1 Introduction

Security mechanisms are only effective when used correctly. Strong cryptography, provably correct

22 years later Johnny still can't encrypt... We still rely on users to do security tasks that they aren't good at

Creating unique and memorable passwords



Users have many misconceptions about passwords

MISCONCEPTION

Keyboard patterns are secure



MISCONCEPTION

Adding! to the end makes it secure

Password!

iloveyou!

monkey!



Password perceptions study

iloveyou88

ieatkale88

Iloveyou88 much more secure















ieatkale88 much more secure

B. Ur, J. Bees, S. Segreti, L. Bauer, N. Christin, and L. F. Cranor. Do users' perceptions of password security match reality? CHI 2016.

Password perceptions study

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MISCONCEPTION








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
B. Ur, J. Bees, S. Segreti, L. Bauer, N. Christin, and L. F. Cranor. Do users' perceptions of password security match reality? CHI 2016.


Password perceptions study



B. Ur, J. Bees, S. Segreti, L. Bauer, N. Christin, and L. F. Cranor. Do users' perceptions of password security match reality? CHI 2016.

Most password meters don't help much





Practical Recommendations for Stronger, More Usable Passwords Combining Minimum-strength, Minimum-length, and Blocklist Requirements

Joshua Tan, Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor Carnegie Mellon University {jstan,lbauer,nicolasc,lorrie}@cmu.edu

ABSTRACT

Multiple mechanisms exist to encourage users to create stronger passwords, including minimum-length and character-class requirements, prohibiting blocklisted passwords, and giving feedback on the strength of candidate passwords. Despite much research, there is little definitive, scientific guidance on how these mechanisms should be combined and configured to best effect. Through two online experiments, we evaluated combinations of minimum-length and character-class requirements, blocklists, and a minimum-strength requirement that requires passwords to exceed a strength threshold according to neural-network-driven password-strength estimates.

Our results lead to concrete recommendations for policy configurations that produce a good balance of security and usability. In particular, for high-value user accounts we recommend policies that combine minimum-strength and minimum-length requirements. While we offer recommendations for organizations required to use blocklists, using blocklists does not provide further gains. Interestingly, we also find that against expert attackers, character-class requirements, traditionally associated with producing stronger passwords, in practice may provide very little improvement and may even reduce effective security.

1 INTRODUCTION

To help users create stronger passwords, system administrators often require passwords to exceed a certain length, contain at least a specific number of character classes, or not appear on a blocklist [19]. Users are also often nudged to create stronger passwords by password meters that give feedback on the strength of candidate passwords and suggestions about how to improve them.

Early guidance for how to deploy these approaches relied mostly on common sense and experts' opinions [17, 18]. Over the past decade, a scientific basis has emerged for what requirements are most effective at encouraging users to create passwords that are strong but still memorable. For example, research has shown that increasing minimum length may increase password strength more than relying just on character class requirements [26]; that password meters can very effectively nudge users to create stronger passwords [28]; and that carefully configured blocklists can help prevent users from picking easily guessed passwords [8].

These early efforts shed light on which password requirements were more or less effective, but stopped short of providing empirically evaluated, definitive guidance for how to combine requirements. In this paper, we seek to address this. Building on Users cope with lots of passwords by reusing them



Security Behavior Observatory

- Network of instrumented home
 Windows computers
- ~200 active participants
- Natural observation + surveys and interviews
- Data includes hashed passwords

People reuse their passwords a lot


On average, participants had

- 26 different accounts
- 10 distinct passwords

People reuse their passwords a lot


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


S. Pearman, J. Thomas, P. Emami Naeini, H. Habib, L. Bauer, N. Christin, L. Cranor, S. Egelman, and A. Forget. Let's go in for a closer look: Observing passwords in their natural habitat. CCS 2017.

Lots of reuse across almost all categories of websites



Attackers exploit password reuse



Users encouraged or required to change their passwords frequently

PASSWORDS ARE LIKE UNDERPANTS



Change them often, keep them private and never share them with anyone.

Why require password changes?

Lock out attackers who have learned users' passwords



Testing this theory at UNC

- Mandatory password change every 3 months
- Researchers obtained and cracked hashed defunct passwords to 7,700+ accounts





Knowing old password can we predict new one?

Researchers tried to guess new passwords by making small changes to old passwords



Predictable transformations



Predictable transformations

Capitalization: tarheels#1 → tArheels#1


Substitution: tarheels#1 → tarheels#2

Keyboard transform: tarheels#1 → tarheels#!

Date: tarheel#0510 → tarheel#0810

Knowing prior passwords helps predict next one

- Online attack
 - 17% of accounts cracked within 5 guesses
- Offline attack
 - 41% of accounts cracked within 3 seconds on a 2.67GHz processor



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Time to rethink mandatory password changes

By: Lorrie Cranor, Chief Technologist I Mar 2, 2016 10:55AM

TAGS: Authentication | Human-computer interaction | Passwords | Research

Data security is a process that evolves over time as new threats emerge and new countermeasures are developed. The FTC's longstanding advice to companies has been to conduct risk assessments, taking into account factors such as the sensitivity of information they collect and the availability of low-cost measures to mitigate risks. The FTC has also advised companies to keep abreast of



Categories

Data security (7)

Privacy (12)

Passwords (2)

Authentication (2)

MAC address tracking (2)

Mobile location analytics (2)

Wi-Fi tracking (1)

Mobile device settings (3)

In-app purchases (1)

Human-computer interaction (4)

Accountability (4)

Personal harms (3)

Data sharing risks (2)

Research (6)



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The problems with forcing regular password expiry

Version: 1

Created: 11 April 2016 Updated: 15 April 2016

Topics: Passwords, Best Practice

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
in LinkedIn f Facebook J Twitter 8 Google+

Why CESG decided to advise against this long-established

Related Content

June 2017: NIST recommends against regular password expiry





2FA and password managers can improve password security, but adoption is low



Login

Carnegie Mellon University

AndrewID Password

What is this? **다** Need help? Device: Mobile 1+3 (XXX-XXX-8412)

Choose an authentication method

Duo Push recommended

Send Me a Push

Passcode

Enter a Passcode

Remember me for 30 days




Collected data on 2FA rollout at CMU

- Surveyed ~1,200 people 1-3 weeks before mandatory adoption deadline
- Surveyed ~800 people 3 months after deadline
- Helpdesk and access log data



J. Colnago, S. Devlin, M. Oates, C. Swoopes, L. Bauer, L. Cranor, and N. Christin. "It's Not Actually That Horrible": Exploring Adoption of Two-Factor Authentication at a University, CHI 2018.

Students perceive 2FA more negatively than faculty and staff



New users need convincing

Why should I?

"Nothing a CMU student can access on the network is private or important enough to warrant this inane policy."

My friends hate it

"I have heard it is a complete hassle and people regret doing it."

But it turns out to be not so bad

"I previously assumed it would be more of a pain than it was worth. It's not actually that horrible."

SUBSCRIBE



BUSINESS

CULTURE

DESIGN

GEAR


SCIENCE

SECURITY

TRANSPORTATION

APRIL GLASER GEAR 01.24.16 7:00 AM

YOU NEED A PASSWORD MANAGER. HERE ARE SOME GOOD FREE ONES



Why are password manager (and generator) adoption rates so low?

- Lack of awareness
- Underestimate risk of password reuse
- Overestimate risk of password manager compromise
- Confusing prompts
- Usability and reliability problems

Users of built-in password managers may be driven more by convenience, while users of separately installed tools appear more driven by security



Privacy and transparency

Privacy policies and nutrition labels

Online tracking icons

Cookie consent banners



Privacy and transparency

Privacy policies and nutrition labels

Online tracking icons

Cookie consent banners



About Our Privacy Policy

Whenever you do something like buy one of our products, watch a information is created. Because we know your privacy is importan to explain how we collect, use and protect that information. There and the actual policy is written in an easy to understand "Frequ (FAQ) format (/sites/privacy_policy/terms). We want to simplif make informed choices about your privacy, and then spend the n products and services.

Effective July 24, 2015

A Quick Summary of Ou Policy

Our Privacy Policy applies to your use of all products, service and our AT&T affiliates, such as DIRECTV, unless they have Because some apps, including some AT&T and DTV branded information, or use information in different ways, they may ha and/or terms and conditions. These apps may also offer you your personal information.

Back to Top

Our privacy commitments


- We don't sell your Personal Information to anyone for a
- We keep your Personal Information in our business rec until it is no longer needed for business, tax or legal purposes.
- We will keep your information safe using encryption or other appropriate security controls.

ALL A CHAN CILLES HOLIS

AT&T Privacy Policy FAQ

Customer Proprietary Network

Della



244 HOURS PER YEAR





"ONLY IN SOME FANTASY WORLD

do users actually read these notices and understand their implications before clicking to indicate their consent"

 United States President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Big Data and Privacy, May 2014





How can we put people in control over their personal information?



By what criteria should we measure effectiveness?

Notice the notice? Stop and read? **Understand? Useful information?** Impact behavior?





Nutrition Facts

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Potassium timg	27%	8%
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Sugars 4g		-15805
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Vitamin E	8%	2%
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Insoluble Fiber 8g Sugars 9g Protein 60

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12%

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
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
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Towards a privacy "nutrition label"

- Standardized format
 - People learn where info is
 - Facilitates policy comparisons
- Standardized language
 - People learn terminology
- Brief
 - People find info quickly
- Linked to extended view
 - Get more details if needed





information we collect	ways we us	s we use your information information shari				
we collect	provide service and maintain site	marketing	telemarketing	profiling	other companies	public forums
contact information		opt out	opt out		opt out	opt in
cookies		opt out	opt out			
demographic information		opt out	opt out			
financial information						
health information		opt out	opt out			
preferences		opt out	opt out			opt in
purchasing information		opt out	opt out			opt in
social security number & gov't ID						
your activity on this site		opt out	opt out			
your location						

cups.cs.cmu.edu/privacyLabel/

P.G. Kelley, J. Bresee, L.F. Cranor, and R.W. Reeder. A "Nutrition Label" for Privacy. SOUPS 2009.

P.G. Kelley, L.J. Cesca, J. Bresee, and L.F. Cranor. Standardizing Privacy Notices: An Online Study of the Nutrition Label Approach. CHI2010.




ACTS	WHAT DOES BANK OF AMERICA DO WITH YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION? Financial companies choose how they share your personal information. Under federal law, that means the right to limit some but not all the properties of the propertie
Why?	personally identification of the personal person
	oles we collect and share depend on the product or service your
	information. Please read this increase information we collect and share depend on the product or service you have with The types of personal information we collect and share depend on the product or service you have with
What?	us.
	account balances, transaction ristory
	and investment experience
	themers' personal information to run their everyday business
How?	All financial companies need to share customers' personal information to run their everyday business In the section below, we list the reasons financial companies can share their customers' personal information; the reasons Bank of America chooses to share; and whether you can limit this sharing.

teasons we can share your personal information	Does Bank of America share?	Can you limit this sharing?	
MOUT	Yes	No	
transactions, induced to credit bureaus	Yes	No	
For our marketing purposes — with service providers we use to offer our products and services to you (please see below to limit the ways we			
contact you)	Yes	No	
For joint marketing with other financial companies	Yes	No	
For our affiliates' everyday business purposes — Information about your transactions and experiences	Yes	Yes	
- Information about		Yes	
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For nonaffiliates to market to you — for accounts other than credit card accounts and Sponsored Accounts, such as insurance, investments, deposit and lending			


FACTS	
Why?	Financial companies choose how they share your personal information. Federal law gives consumers the right to limit some but not all sharing. Federal law also requires us to tell you how we collect, share, and protect your personal information. Please read this notice The types of personal information we collect and share depends on the product or social Security Number and incore.
	ocredit history and credit scores When you are no longer our customer, we continue to share your information as All financial.
How?	All financial companies need to share customers' personal information to run their everyday business. In the section below, we list the reasons financial companies can whether you can limit this sharing.
Reasons we ca	on share your

Reasons we can share your personal information For our everyday business purposes – such as to process your transactions, maintain your account(s), respond to court orders and least to credit business.	Does CIT sha	re? Can you limit this
For our marketing purposes –	Yes	No No
For our assure	Yes	No
and a desired and a second des	No	We don't share
information about veryday business num	Yes	No No
Monarrillates to market to you	No	We don't share
Questions? Call: 1-800-681-0740 or go to: http://www.	No	We don't share



Android Privacy Facts

- Task: select apps for friend with new smartphone
 - Choose from 2 similar apps w/ different permission requests
- Participants who saw Privacy Facts more likely to select apps with fewer permissions
 - Brand and rating reduce effect





Apple will require apps to add privacy 'nutrition labels' starting December 8th

The labels explain what data is collected at a glance

By Ian Carlos Campbell | @soupsthename | Nov 5, 2020, 8:42pm EST











Privacy & Security Facts

Security Camera S200

Smart++, incorporated in United States 2017 Firmware version 3.1.6 (updated June 12, 2018)







PRIVACY

Collected data: Video, device configuration, login info

Purpose: Security, maintenance, advertisement

Retention time: Forever

Shared with: Manufacturer

Choices: None

Independent Privacy Lab

Rating: WWW
Level of detail for the data that Identifiable

is being used:

Level of detail for the data that is being collected:

SECURITY

Automatic updates: No

Updates lifetime: Until January 1, 2020

Choices: Configurable updates, purchase extended updates

Encrypted communication: Yes

Authentication method: Fingerprint

Internet connectivity: Required

Independent IT Security Institute



MORE INFORMATION

Tip(s): Register your device to receive updates

Scan QR code for manufacturer's privacy and security information





P. Emami-Naeini, H. Dixon, Y. Agarwal, and L. Cranor. 2019. Exploring How Privacy and Security Factor into IoT Device Purchase Behavior. CHI 2019.


Security & Privacy Overview

Smart Device Co.

Smart Video Doorbell NS200

Firmware version: 2.5.1 - updated on: 11/12/2020

The device was manufactured in: China



CMU IoT Security and Privacy Label CISPL 1.0 iotsecurity privacy.org



iotsecurityprivacy.org

Security & Privacy Details Smart Device Co.

Smart Video Doorbell NS200

Firmware version: 2.5.1 - updated on: 11/12/2020 The device was manufactured in: China

	Security updates		Autor	natic - Available until at le	ast 1/	1/2022	0
	Access control		Password - Factory default - User changeable, Multi-factor authentication, Multiple user accounts are allo				o ved
_	Security oversight		No security audits				0
	Ports and protocols		www.NS200.smartdeviceco.com/ports				
Security	Hardware safety		Not d	lisclosed			
Mechanisms	Software safety		www	NS200.smartdeviceco	.com	/sw_safety	
	Personal safety		www.NS200.smartdeviceco.com/user_safety				
	, ,		www	NS200.smartdeviceco	.com	/vul_report	
	Software and hardware composition list		www	NS200.smartdeviceco	.com	/BOM	
	Encryption and key mana	agement	www	NS200.smartdeviceco	.com	/encryption	
	Sensor data collection	Visual	٦	Audio		Motion	
	Sensor type	Camera	0	Microphone	0	Motion sensor	0
	Collection frequency	Continuous - Option to opt out	0	Continuous - Option to opt	0	Continuous - Option to op out	o to
	Purpose	Providing device functions	0	Providing device functions, Research	0	Providing device function Research	16, G
	Data stored on the device	Identified	0	No device storage	0	Pseudonymized	0
	Local data retention time	Up to a year	0	No retention	0	Up to a month	C
_	Data stored in the cloud	Identified - Data subject access request	0	Identified - Option to delete	0	No cloud storage	c
(1)	Cloud data retention time	Up to 10 years	0	Up to two months	0	No cloud storage	C
Data	Data shared with	Manufacturer, Government	0	Manufacturer	0	Manufacturer, Third partic	es C
Practices	Data sharing frequency	Periodic	0	Periodic - Adjustable	0	Periodic - Adjustable	C
	Data sold to	Not disclosed	٥	Not sold	0	Third parties	С
	Other collected data	Account info, Payment info	, Conta	ct info, Device setup info, Devi	e tech	info, Device usage info	С
	Data linkage		Data	will not be linked with a	ther d	lata sources	C
	What will be inferred from	n user's data	Not d	lisclosed			G
	Special data handling pra	actices for children	No				G
	In compliance with		GDPR				0
	Privacy policy		www.NS200.smartdeviceco.com/policy				
_	Call Smart Device Co. with	your questions at	1 000	-000-0000			О
A	Email Smart Device Co. wi	th your questions at	info@smartdeviceco.com				G
	Functionality when offline		Limited functionality				G
More Information	Functionality with no data	processing	Limit	ed functionality			C
monnauon	Physical actuations and tri	ggers	Devic	e blinks when motion i	s dete	ected	0
	Compatible platforms		Ama	zon Alexa			0

Privacy and transparency

Privacy policies and nutrition labels

Online tracking icons

Cookie consent banners



Woman Stalked Across 8 Websites By Obsessed Shoe Advertisement

NEWS IN BRIEF

October 12, 2015

VOL 51 ISSUE 41

News · Technology · Advertising · Fashion









LAWRENCEVILLE, GA—Expressing her growing unease at repeatedly spotting the same picture and text lurking in the corners of her favorite webpages, local woman Laura Spelman confirmed Monday that she has been stalked across eight different sites by an obsessed Nine West shoe advertisement. "When I first saw the ad for the black ballet flats in my Facebook news feed, it seemed harmless enough, but then I went to check the forecast on Weather.com and it was waiting there for me—it's really kind of disturbing," said Spelman, adding that she has taken to scrolling away from the fanatical ad as fast as possible whenever she catches sight of it. "I



Merrell Encore Mid Boot Q2 Women's Boots

\$149.95



UGG Niels Women's Boots

\$194.95



Rieker Z6784 Women's Dress Boots

\$120



Born Kristina Women's Pull-on Boots

\$135





Do people recognize the AdChoices icon?

1,505-participant online survey



Varied icon and taglines







- Why did I get this ad?
- Interest based ads
- AdChoices
- Sponsor ads
- Learn about your ad choices
- Configure ad preferences
- 'No tagline'

What would happen if you clicked on the icon?

AdChoices



More ads will pop up 56%

45% Will take you to a page where you can buy advertisements on this website

27% Will take you to a page where you can opt out of tailored ads

What would happen if you clicked on the icon?

Configure Ad Preferences AdChoices

- 42% 56% More ads will pop up
- 15% 45% Will take you to a page where you can buy advertisements on this website
- 50% 27% Will take you to a page where you can opt out of tailored ads

CHAPTER 20. CALIFORNIA CONSUMER PRIVACY ACT REGULATIONS PROPOSED TEXT OF REGULATIONS

§ 999.315. Requests to Opt-Out

(a) A business shall provide two or more designated methods for submitting requests to opt-out, including, at a minimum, an interactive webform accessible via a clear and conspicuous link titled "Do Not Sell My Personal Information," or "Do Not Sell My Info," on the business's website or mobile application. Other acceptable methods for submitting these requests include but are not limited to a tall free phone number a designated amail address a form

(e) Opt-Out Button or Logo

(1) The following opt-out button or logo may be used in addition to posting the notice of right to opt-out, but not in lieu of any posting of the notice. [BUTTON OR LOGO TO BE ADDED IN A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE REGULATIONS AND MADE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT.]









Opting out







Do not sell (personal info)













Refined icons for evaluation

ID-Card

Slash-Dollar

Stop-Dollar



DAA











Combo testing


- Mturk study with 1,416 participants
- Tested 3 icons + no icon







- Tested 5 taglines + no tagline
 - Do not sell my personal information
 - Do not sell my info
 - Privacy choices
 - Privacy options
 - Personal info choices
- 23 combinations tested



Our recommended icon



iOS toggle switch





OAG's revised proposed regulations

(1) The following opt-out button or logo may be used in addition to posting the notice of right to opt-out, but not in lieu of any posting of the notice of right to opt-out.



(2) When the opt-out button is used, it shall appear to the left of the "Do Not Sell My Personal Information" or "Do Not Sell My Info" link, as demonstrated below, and shall be approximately the same size as other buttons on the business's webpage.

[BUTTON OR LOGO TO BE ADDED IN A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE REGULATIONS AND MADE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC COMMENT.]





So we ran another study

Stylized toggle CalAG toggle

CalAG-X toggle







+ swapped colors

- Insignificant difference between icons with the big and small X
- But big differences between the CalAG icon and our stylized toggle
- CalAG icon more likely to be misinterpreted as actual toggle
- Small differences based on color
- Some small changes can sometimes make a big difference and you won't know unless you test with users

Then the OAG removed the button

- Button completely removed from regulation
- OAG will design a uniform and recognizable opt-out button in the future

Former subsection (f), regarding the proposed opt-out button, has been deleted in response to the various comments received during the public comment period. The OAG has removed this subsection in order to further develop and evaluate a uniform opt-out logo or button for use by all businesses to promote consumer awareness of how to easily opt-out of the sale of personal information.

Then the OAG asked us to test more icons!

- Which of these icons, paired with the "Do Not Sell My Personal Information" link text performs best
 - standing out to users on a website?
 - communicating the presence of a donot-sell choice?
 - motivating users to click?
- ... and only recruit participants from CA















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rs regulations

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PROGRAMS

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Attorney General Becerra Announces Approval of Additional Regulations That Empower Data Privacy Under the California Consumer Privacy Act

Press Release / Attorney General Becerra Announces Approval of Additional Re...

Monday, March 15, 2021

Contact: (916) 210-6000, agpressoffice@doj.ca.gov

Includes new Privacy Options icon that businesses are encouraged to use to help build consumer awareness of Californians' privacy rights

SACRAMENTO – California Attorney General Xavier Becerra today announced additional regulations approved by the Office of Administrative Law that advance protections for Californians seeking to control the sale of their personal information. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) gives consumers new tools and rights for protecting their data privacy. These newly-approved rules strengthen the language of the CCPA regulations approved by OAL in August 2020, including protecting consumers from unlawful business practices that may be deceptive or misleading.

CCPA PRIVACY OPTIONS ICON



Read more at cups.cs.cmu.edu/optout

Privacy and transparency

Privacy policies and nutrition labels

Online tracking icons

Cookie consent banners



What makes a consent interface useable?

- Addresses user needs
- Requires minimal user effort
- Makes users aware of what choices exist and where to find them
- Conveys choices and their implications so users understand them easily (comprehension)
- Users are are satisfied with interface and choice options, trust their choices will be honored (sentiment)
- Allows users to change their decision due to errors or changing their mind (decision reversal)
- Doesn't nudge users towards less privacy-protective options

Common usability problems with cookie banners

- Nudge users to accept all cookies by presenting that option as a big button
- Require extra steps to make other choices – first you have to click through to cookie settings
- It's not even clear what the other choices are without clicking through

Cookie consent

We use our own and third-party cookies to show you more relevant content based on your browsing and navigation history. Please accept or manage your cookie settings below. Here's our cookie policy

Cookie settings

Accept all cookies



Hana Habib, Megan Li, Ellie Young, Lorrie Faith Cranor

Paper to be presented at CHI 2022


"Okay, whatever": An Evaluation of Cookie Consent Interfaces

Evaluating the impact of design parameters on the usability of cookie consent interfaces

- Inspection evaluation
 - Reviewed ~200 cookie consent banners from 5 CMPs
 - Checked for dark patterns and found them on 88% of banners (most common: easiest option is to accept all cookies)
 - Identified key design parameters
- User study
 - Tested 12 cookie consent design variants with users, evaluating 6 usability factors


Recruited 1,316 crowd workers from Prolific

- Participants assigned website shopping task
 - Select item and put it in your shopping cart
- Exposed to 1 of 12 consent interface variants
- Asked to fill out survey
- Asked to review consent interface again and answer more survey questions
- Median completion time ~16 min, compensation \$5.00
- Analyzed interactions and survey responses from 1,109 participants
 - Where they clicked, consent choices made, time spent, etc.






"Best-practices" variant







Preferences" interface



"Worst-practices" variant







"Corner button" variant


Cookie preferences

Single-layer "Cookie Preferences" interface






Some variables impacted consent decisions, others not so much Inline options led users to restrict cookies




Absence of fully-blocking or banner notice led to poor awareness



- No participants interacted with the Cookie Preferences button
- Less awareness of a privacy decision & available cookie options compared to bestpractices


Absence of in-line options led to lower investment in decision-making



More likely to choose "easiest option" and "not at all carefully" on survey compared to best-practices

But.... absence of in-line options led to higher focused comprehension scores





Perhaps because participants who had in-line options available didn't drill down to cookie preferences screens with definitions

Persistent "Cookie Preferences" button enabled decision reversal

- 82% of best-practices participants said they would use the button to change their decision
 - Only 45% of participants who saw a link to cookie policy but no button said they would visit the cookie policy to change their decision
- No significant impact due to absence of reversal instruction text

Standard cookie categories cause confusion

- Performance cookies
 - Cookies that help measure and improve website features
 - Only 48% of participants selected correct definition
- Functional cookies
 - Cookies that help personalize the website's services for you
 - Only 16% of participants selected correct definition

Categories used by OneTrust and other CMPs are from ICC UK Cookie Guide https://www.cookielaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/icc uk cookiesguide revnov.pdf

The burden of user consent

- Considerable cost to reading cookie consent interfaces, comprehending available options, and making a decision at large numbers of websites
- Potential long-term solution: browser-based consent management

- Don't assume you have to tradeoff security/privacy and usability
- Don't ask people to do security tasks they aren't good at
- Is it usable? Test with the people who will be using it
- Look for automated and standardized solutions that don't rely on user effort
 - Standard icon and notice formats
 - Machine-readable notices and tools to search them and present useful information to users
 - Password managers so users can create random passwords and don't have to remember them

Research discussed in this talk was funded in part by Carnegie Corporation of New York, Carnegie Mellon CyLab, DARPA, Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft Research, Innovators Network Foundation, NSA, NSF, PNC Center for Financial Services Innovation, and The Privacy Projects.

Lorrie Faith Cranor

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Papers: cups.cs.cmu.edu

Privacy engineering masters and certificate programs: privacy.cs.cmu.edu

Carnegie Mellon University
Security and Privacy Institute

Lab